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Written Evidence from Dr Nicholas Ryder, Professor in Financial Crime, Bristol Law 
School, Faculty of Business and Law, University of the West of England, Bristol.
Introduction
The submission provides a summary of the research conducted by Professor Nicholas Ryder 
on money laundering, the financing of terrorism, the respective legislative frameworks, 
regulatory agencies and the enforcement of financial crime legislation in the United Kingdom 
(UK).  The submission presents a summary of the key findings in the hope that they will 
support the Treasury Committee’s inquiry into Economic Crime.
The anti-money laundering, counter-terrorist financing and sanctions regimes
Money Laundering
It is extremely difficult to measure the true extent of money laundering, with many previous 
attempts proving largely unsuccessful.1 Any measurement is hampered by the fact that there 
are so many different ways that organised criminals launder money. Nonetheless, there have 
been claims that money laundering is one of the world’s largest industries, with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) noting that it was equal to 2-5 per cent of global gross 
domestic product (GDP). Other studies have suggested that money laundering is $500bn,2 
$1.5tn 3 or $2.85tn per year.4 In the UK, it was estimated that the amount of money laundered 
annually ranged from £19bn to £48bn.5 HM Treasury noted that “each year £10bn of illicit 
funds passed through the regulated sector”,6 whilst Transparency International reported that 
the figure was £48bn.7  If we take the IMF estimation of between 2 and 5 per cent GDP and 
base it on the GDP figures for the UK in 2017 (£2.624tn) we are looking at between 
£52.48bn and £131.2bn. The amount of money involved is therefore of epic proportions and 
requires an effective monitoring and prevention strategy.  
Terrorist Financing 
The financial process adopted by terrorists to accumulate funds is different to that adopted by 
money launderers. Terrorist financing is more commonly referred to as ‘reverse money 
laundering’, which is a financial practice that seeks to transform ‘clean’ or ‘legitimate” 
money, into ‘dirty’ money that is funnelled to finance acts of terrorism.  Conversely, money 
1 See Unger, B. The scale and impacts of money laundering (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2007).
2 R. Spalek ‘Regulation, White–Collar Crime and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International’ (2001) 
Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 40 166–179, 167.
3 S. Maylam, ‘Prosecution for Money Laundering in the UK’ (2002) Journal of Financial Crime, 10 157–158, 
158.
4 J. Walker ‘Modelling Global Money Laundering Flows – some findings’ 
<http://www.johnwalkercrimetrendsanalysis.com.au/ML%20method.htm> accessed 6 June 2011. 
5 J. Harvey, ‘An Evaluation of Money Laundering Policies’ (2005) Journal of Money Laundering Control 8(4) 
339–345, 340.
6 Financial Conduct Authority Anti-money laundering annual report 2012/13 (Financial Conduct Authority: 
London, 2013) at 3. 
7 Transparency International ‘Corruption Statistics’, n/d, available from 
http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption/statistics-and-quotes/uk-corruption, accessed June 16 2016.
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laundering involves the conversion of ‘dirty’ or ‘illegal’ money into clean money via its 
laundering through three recognised phases, placement, layering and integration.  The 
prevention of terrorist financing is difficult due to the large number of mechanisms used to 
fund acts of terrorism.  Traditionally, terrorists relied on two sources of funding: state and 
private sponsors.  State sponsored terrorism, refers to nation states providing logistical and 
financial support to terrorist organisations.  However, since the terrorist attacks in 2001, state-
sponsored acts of terrorism have declined and terrorists receive funding from private sponsors 
or donors.  Therefore, terrorists have become self-sufficient, as acknowledge by the official 
report on the terrorist attacks on London on the 7 July 2005.8 Terrorists are able to access 
funds through a broad spectrum of measures including kidnap for ransom, robbery, drug 
trading, counterfeiting and the sale of conflict diamonds.9   The wide range of sources 
available to terrorists is illustrated by the activities of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levante 
(ISIL) who have exploited four funding streams: the control of oil reserves, kidnapping for 
ransom, foreign and private financial benefactors and antiquities.10  Al Shabaab have 
obtained funding from the illegal smuggling of ivory, charcoal exports and the illegal 
importation of contraband sugar.  Boko Haram are funded by private donors, misapplied 
charitable donations, the sale of goods and other lucrative activities, business 
profits/logistical support, contributions from members of a terrorist group, begging by 
vulnerable persons, extortion of civilians by means of intimidation, arms smugglers, cash 
couriers and financial contributions of political leaders. 
It is also important to discuss the concept of cheap terrorism.  The threat posed by cheap 
terrorism was identified by HM Treasury who stated the “UK experience bears out the 
relatively low costs required for an effective terrorist attack”.11  Examples of ‘cheap 
terrorism’ include the first attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993, an estimated cost of 
only $400.12  Two years after the World Trade Centre attack Timothy McVeigh detonated a 
truck bomb outside Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.  In an interview 
with MSNBC, Timothy McVeigh estimated that the total costs of the attack, including the 
truck rental, fertilizer, nitro methane and other costs amounted to $5,000.13  The terrorist 
attacks by Al Shabaab on the Westgate Mall in Kenya “cost less than $5,000 to execute” 14 
and the materials used in the Boston Marathon bombings [in 2013] reportedly cost about 
$500”.15  It has been estimated that “the cost of making a suicide bomb can be as low as $5, 
while the deployment of a suicide bomber including transportation and reconnaissance, can 
cost as little as $200”.16 More recently, there has been an increase in the number of ‘lone 
8 House of Commons Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (House of 
Commons 2005, 23).
9 See generally Ryder, N. The Financial War on Terror: A review of counter-terrorist financing strategies since 
2001 (Routledge, 2015).
10 Ryder, N. ‘Out with the old and … in with the old? A critical review of the Financial War on Terrorism on the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant’ (2018) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 41(2), 79-95.
11 HM Treasury Combating the financing of terrorism. A report on UK action (HM Treasury: London, 2002) at 
11.
12 Gaddis, J. ‘And Now This: Lessons from the Old Era for the New One’, in Talbott, S. and Chander, N. (eds.) 
The Age of Terror: America and the World After September 11 (Basic Books: New York, 2001) at 6.
13 NBC News The McVeigh Tapes: confessions of an American terrorist (19 April 2010), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/36135258/ns/msnbc_tv/#.VDJpOU10zIU, accessed October 6 2017.
14 Department of Treasury Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen 
before the Center for a New American Security on Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing (March 4 
2014), available from http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx, accessed 
September 22 2014.
15 Ibid.
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wolf’ and cheap acts of terrorism within the European Union (EU).  For example, in August 
2017 a terrorist driving a van killed 13 people in Barcelona.  In June 2017, one person was 
killed outside Finsbury Park Mosque in a terrorist attack and terrorists on London Bridge and 
Borough Market killed eight people.  A month before the terrorist attacks in London, 23 
people were killed and 59 injured following a terrorist attack by a suicide bomber in 
Manchester.  Further terrorist attacks within the EU occurred in Paris, Stockholm, Berlin, 
Normandy, Nice and Brussels.  Despite this caution Waszak claims that “the cost of making a 
suicide bomb can be as low as $5, while the deployment of a suicide bomber including 
transportation and reconnaissance, can cost as little as $200”.17 There are three common 
themes in these terrorist attacks: the use of low capability weapons, lone wolf terrorists and 
cheap terrorism. These three factors illustrate that the practical difficulties faced by law 
enforcement agencies and the security services in limited the funding streams of terrorist 
groups.
The current legislative and regulatory landscape, including any weaknesses in the rules 
and their enforcement
Financial Conduct Authority
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) have concentrated on imposing financial penalties 
on corporations who have breached financial crime legislation. For example, in 2007 the FSA 
imposed fines totalling £5.3m, 2008 £22.7m, 2009 £35m, 2010 £66.1m, 2011 £89.1m, 2012 
£311.5m, 2013 £474.1m, 2014 £1.47bn, 2015 £905m, 2016 £22.2m, 2017 £229.5m and 
£3.4m.  However, the impact of these fines on persistent repeat offenders is negligible as the 
fines represent a small percentage of their annual profits.  Conversely, there has been some 
success in relation to the number of prosecutions and convictions for money laundering.  For 
example, between 1999 and 2007, there were 7,569 money-laundering prosecutions in the 
UK, resulting in 3,796 convictions. This amounts to a 50.15 per cent conviction rate.  The 
conviction rate of over 50 per cent suggests that the mechanisms as described above are 
working fairly well within the UK.  
Serious Fraud Office
The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) has been subjected to intense criticism due to its previous 
prosecutorial failures including Guinness, Blue Arrow, Maxwell and Levitt.  The SFO has 
been in the headlines for its handling of the bribery allegations against BAE Systems and its 
abandonment of the investigation into arms sales in Saudi Arabia.  However, it is important 
to emphasize that the SFO has increased the frequency of its investigations and prosecutions.  
For example, between 2001 and 2006, the SFO reported a conviction rate of 61%.18  This 
increased to 71% in 2007.19  By 2008, the conviction rate had fallen slightly to 68%.20  In 
2009, the SFO achieved a conviction rate of 91 per cent, 84 per cent in 201, 73 per cent in 
2011, 70 per cent in 2012, 85 per cent in 2013 and 78 per cent in 2014.  The conviction rate 
fell to 57% in 2015.  The SFO reported, “That between 2012 and 2016 the conviction rate 
was 65% per defendant and 81% per case, with 75 defendants in 25 cases convicted”.  There 
16 Waszak, J. ‘The obstacles to suppressing radical Islamic terrorist financing’ (2004) Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International law, 36, 673-710, at 673.
17 Ibid.
18 Serious Fraud Office Annual Report 2006/2007 (Serious Fraud Office: London, 2007) at 4.
19 Ibid.
20 Serious Fraud Office Annual Report 2007/2008 (Serious Fraud Office: London, 2008) at 5.
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is an overlap between the regulatory remit of the FSA and SFO, a position that could have 
been be resolved by the creation of a single Economic Crime Agency (ECA) as proposed by 
the Coalition Government in 2010.  Its formation was obstructed by differences of opinion 
within the Coalition Government over its proposed remit and the unparalleled enforcement 
reaction from the SFO and FSA since the financial crisis.  The Home Office decided against 
creating the ECA, and turned its attention to establishing the broader National Crime Agency 
in 2013.  
Corporate Economic Crime
UK efforts to tackle financial crime concentrated on targeting individuals as opposed to 
corporations.  The unsatisfactory nature of this stance, led to the introduction of the failure to 
prevent bribery corporate offence (Bribery Act 2010, s 7).  This has secured several DPAs 
against corporations, but there have been no related prosecutions.  This position is 
unsatisfactory.  DPAs must be used in conjunction with criminal proceedings against 
employees and/or agents of corporations if they are to have a deterrent effect to reduce future 
misconduct.  The introduction of the Senior Managers and Certification Regime by the FCA 
is the most significant mechanism that could overcome the restrictive interpretation of the 
doctrine of corporate criminal. By placing the management of financial crime control within 
the remit of a corporations ‘senior management’ this will allow the courts to identify the 
person who within a corporate structure meets the controlling mind test.  The ability to 
recognise the person who has the controlling mind could go some way to redress this 
problem.  However, in order for this approach to be adopted it would require the FCA to 
liaise with the SFO and other prosecutors to implement this innovative mechanism.  The 
ability of the FCA to instigate financial penalties draws unfavourable comparisons with the 
provisions in the US and it is recommended that the UK should introduce legislation based on 
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act 1989.  Such a move would 
provide the FCA and other related enforcement agencies with the ability to pursue a series of 
civil actions against corporations for financial crime. 
Conclusions
 
I have made the following conclusions to address some of these weaknesses some of issues 
discussed in this report:
 The UKs money laundering policy is generally compliant with the international 
measures.  Its policy is well managed by HM Treasury and assisted by both the FCA 
and NCA;
 The enforcement of the UK’s money laundering criminal offences under the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002 has been generally effective;
 The UK has a very robust policy toward the financing of terrorism, yet the extensive 
array of sources of finance and cheap acts of terrorism have recently resulted in its 
effectiveness being questioned;
 The UKs enforcement of corporate financial crime breaches is weak in comparison to 
other jurisdictions and the extension of the failure to prevent criminal offences 
(Bribery Act 2010 and Criminal Finances Act 2017) must be questioned;
 
In addition to these suggestions, the Treasury Committee may be interested some of these 
research publications that provide a more in-depth commentary on how the UK has tackled 
financial crime:
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 Ryder, N. The Financial War on Terror: A review of counter-terrorist financing 
strategies since 2001 (Routledge, 2015, 210 pp),
 Ryder, N. The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime: The Perfect Storm? (Edward 
Elgar, 2014, 323 pp),
 Ryder, N. Money laundering an endless cycle? A comparative analysis of the anti-
money laundering policies in the USA, UK, Australia and Canada (Routledge, 2012, 
200 pp),
 Ryder, N. ‘Too scared to prosecute and too scared to jail? A critical and comparative 
analysis of enforcement of financial crime legislation against corporations in the 
United States of America and the United Kingdom (2018) Journal of Criminal Law, 
[In Press],
 Ryder, N. ‘Out with the old and … in with the old? A critical review of the Financial 
War on Terrorism on the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant’ (2018) Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism, 41(2), 79-95,
 Ryder, N. ‘Banks in Defense of the Homeland:  Nexus of Ethics and Suspicious 
Activity Reporting’ (2013) Contemporary Issues in Law (Special Issue on Law, 
Ethics and Counter-Terrorism), 12(4), 311-347, with Turksen, U, and 
 Ryder, N. ‘The Financial Services Authority, the Reduction of Financial Crime and 
the Money Launderer – A Game of Cat and Mouse’, (2008) Cambridge Law Journal, 
67(3), 635-653.
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